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Procuring complex performance in construction: London Heathrow 
Terminal 5 and a Private Finance Initiative Hospital 
 
Abstract 
This paper takes as its starting point that complex projects, interpreted as multiple 
dependent interactions between many stakeholders over time, challenge traditional 
procurement practices based on the serial purchase of discrete components. The paper 
examines how the procurement management of such projects – procuring complex 
performance – can be conducted. The paper utilises two contrasting case study 
examples of high profile UK construction project procurement. The findings suggest 
that the choice of mechanism or interface for the governance of upstream supply 
relationships critically relates to subsequent performance. The theoretical  contribution 
is a fusion of procurement literature with the influential CoPS literature.  
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Introduction 
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Recent scholarship, galvanised by the influence of Vargo and Lusch’s work (2004) on 
service logic and environmentally grounded work such as Mont (2004), has begun to 
question the manufacturing bias and inheritance in many approaches to services. As the 
economy is increasingly servitized (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988), the work of 
business to business procurement professionals is increasingly to purchase a 
combination of product and service. One example of this phenomena is the blurring of 
traditional boundaries of ownership, design and post construction performance  in major 
construction projects. This development in part at least reflects previous 
disappointments with traditional “design construct and hand over” to the client models, 
where the construction team takes no responsibility for post construction performance, 
ease of use and flexibility (Egan, 1998). 
 
The contractual forms that are emerging to support this newly ‘servitized’ construction 
model must incentivise the construction industry to provide new levels of service for 
example innovative environmental practices, ease of maintenance, flexibility once in 
use, and ease of ultimate disposal. The client must in effect, procure complex 
performance (as opposed to a complex building), clients increasingly value the “in use 
value” of the building or infrastructure over the bricks and mortar construction.  
The construction industry then is a good sector to study how clients are procuring 
complex performance (PCP). PCP has been defined by Lewis and Roehrich (2009) in 
terms of a matrix comparing high and low transactional complexity, versus high and 
low infrastructural complexity. This is a helpful meta-analysis, but the concern of this 
paper is with the practices that make up procuring complex performance. The overall 
aim is to understand the practices that make up PCP in major construction projects that 
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are also product-service systems. Therefore given that procurement is relatively well 
accepted as professional purchasing, and performance from above indicates a product 
and a service being bought in combination, our focus here is on an initial working 
definition of the complex part of PCP. In line with for example Kash and Rycroft’s 
(2002) definition of technological complexity we see complexity in this context as 
being that which prevents the buyer from simply buying discrete components (including 
service systems) and combining them together – i.e. the task cannot be accomplished by 
the serial and additive transaction mode of traditional (manufacturing) procurement.  
 
To explore this issue of procuring for complex performance the paper compares the 
design, construction phases (therefore excluding the operation phase) of two complex 
construction product-service systems, both located in the UK. The first is the 
construction and delivery to the client operator of a new terminal at London Heathrow 
Airport, Terminal 5 (T5), and the second the construction of a new hospital funded 
under the ‘Private Finance Initiative’ (PFI). In Lewis and Roehrich’s typology, the 
hospital would be high in performance complexity and low (or at least not high) in 
infrastructure complexity (hospitals construction contains many ‘knowns’). The 
construction of T5 however would be both high transaction complexity and high 
infrastructure complexity. Figure 1 positions both project in the procurement 
complexity space. In both cases the focus is on the core project client/contractor 
relationship, with the network of wider relationships necessary to contract and deliver 
complex performance introduced only when necessary to understand client or contractor 
behaviour.  
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[Please insert: Figure 1: The Procurement of Complexity Space, about here] 
 
Conceptual Background 
The conceptual background first covers the Complex Product Systems (CoPS) literature 
(Davies 1997, Davies & Brady, 2000) which has focused on the management of 
complex projects. Secondly, a lack of attention to procurement issues is identified in the 
CoPS literature leading to a review of the supply relationship management and 
contracting literature. 
 
Complex Product Systems 
CoPS can be defined as high cost, technology intensive, customised, capital goods, 
systems, networks, control units, software packages, constructs and services (Hobday, 
2000). Hobday (1998) defines CoPS as large-scale, engineering-intensive products that 
are supplied in unit or batch production and tailored to meet the requirements of 
particular large users. He suggests that where the standard model of innovation (e.g. the 
life cycle) is useful in studying mass production industries, a different analytical 
framework is required to explain supply in CoPS. Industries supplying CoPS are usually 
bilateral oligopolies with a few large suppliers facing a few large customers, or 
monopolists in each country (ibid).  
 
CoPS therefore tend to be temporary structures involving many firms, introducing many 
network co-ordination issues that challenge traditional serial transaction based 
approaches to purchasing and supply: The prime contractor responsible for delivery of a 
CoPS project has to deal with a broad range of decentralised and self-directed 
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organisations in the innovation web, including component suppliers, manufacturers, 
financial institutions, government authorities, and diverse clients; becoming effectively 
a systems integrator, (Davies, Gann and Douglas, 2009; Geyer & Davies, 2000:997). 
Hobday (1998) provides a comprehensive comparison of CoPS and mass production 
industries (see Table 1).  
 
[Please insert: Table 1: CoPS vs. mass production industries (two ideal types), 
about here] 
 
Davies and Brady (2000) suggest that CoPs firms can develop ‘economies of repetition’ 
in moving from one bid to another achieving economies in bid preparation and 
execution from putting in place routines and learning processes. A constant theme of the 
CoPs literature is the need for strong co-ordinating roles in linking projects together. 
However, CoPS approaches do have limitations; for example, they tend not to consider 
the customer’s operating environment or the impact of wider developments (beyond the 
project) (e.g., Geyer & Davies, 2000), and highly relevantly here, often have little to 
report on the formal and informal control mechanisms of procuring complex 
performance. However, Lewis and Roehrich (2009) argue that procuring complex 
performance is associated with various distinct governance challenges. The paper 
therefore adds to the perspective from the CoPS literature formal and informal control 
mechanisms as governance. Formal control is considered as contractual obligations and 
formal organisational mechanisms for cooperation (Ouchi, 1979). In contrast, informal 
control in this study refers to social control and relational governance, relating to 
informal cultures and systems (Ouchi, 1979). 
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Application of formal control  
Formal control is applied through contractually stipulated agreements to reduce hazards 
of opportunisms by specifying a ‘complete relationship framework’ for the contracting 
parties (Williamson, 1975). The formal control approach considers trust as an unreliable 
safeguard and thus it is critical to contracting parties to deploy safeguards based on 
contractual enforcement and monitoring. In practice, drafting a complex and ‘complete’ 
contract, that is a contract that safeguards for every possible future contingency, is 
costly and ineffective due to asymmetric information and, hence, may lead to potential 
inefficiencies in a relationship (Lyons and Metha, 1997; Baiman and Rajan, 2002). In 
practice, asymmetric information and drafting costs result in ‘incomplete’ contracts, 
thus contracting parties can only define procedures and processes for resolving 
unforeseeable contingencies (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Accepting contract 
incompleteness, those contracts may contain non-legally enforceable and poorly 
specified intentions and promises that are easily by misinterpreted by the courts (Deakin 
and Wilkinson, 1998).  
 
In the context of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) as an example of PCP, contracts are 
complex by nature as they consist of agreements covering the design, building, finance 
and operation phases of long-term projects. Such PFI supply arrangements tend to 
increase asset specificity and uncertainty (Lonsdale, 2005; Bennett and Iossa, 2006). 
Contracting for such systems requires the quality of services to be well specified or the 
availability of appropriate performance measures that reward or penalise the service 
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providers accordingly (Hart, 2003). Empirical research shows that the use of PFI 
contracts, for instance, to mitigate relationship risks, is highly problematic due to their 
incompleteness (Froud, 2003).  
 
Application of informal control  
With respect to alternative governance mechanisms, informal control mechanisms are 
based on trust and mutual commitment. Buyer-supplier relationships which are 
characterised by informal control are governed by social processes that promote norms 
of trust, flexibility, solidarity and information exchange (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Informal control mechanisms are applied as safeguards against relationship hazards, a 
way of facilitating the enforcement of obligations and a bilateral approach to problem 
solving (Zand, 1972). Relational approaches, such as informal control mechanisms, are 
appropriate when organisations are inter-dependent with relationships developed when 
two companies build up activity links, resource ties, and actor bonds (Håkansson and 
Snehota, 1995). Hence ongoing interaction in relationships is achieved by managing 
these inter-dependent activities. However, developing and maintaining informal control 
mechanisms in the context of complex procurement arrangements is time- and resource 
consuming (Larson, 1992). Equally, as project scale and scope increase, relationships 
are harder to maintain and sanction through informal control because repeat business 
and cultural homogeneity are less likely (North, 1990).  
 
Interplay of formal and informal control mechanisms in complex procurement projects 
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There is a divergent view within the literature on the relationship of formal and informal 
mechanisms. Some researchers consider trust, as part of informal control mechanisms, 
as a substitute for a complex contracts, as part of formal control mechanisms 
(Granovetter, 1985; Dyer and Singe, 1998). Others argue that trust and formal control 
are inter-related in various dynamic patterns (Larson, 1992; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Klein Woolthuis et al., 
2005; Zheng et al., 2008). For instance, well-specified contracts may actually promote 
more co-operative, long-term, trusting relations; continuity and cooperation may lead to 
contractual refinements that further support greater inter-organisational cooperation 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Joint use of contracts and trust may provide a ground for 
more efficient outcomes than the use of either of them in isolation (North, 1990). In 
terms of public-private relationships, Essig and Batran (2006) state that the strategic 
importance and specificity of individual goods and services influence the particular 
choice of institutional or contractual arrangements. Along the same line, Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) argue that it is important to understand the content of contracts 
and trust and their meaning in relationship development to further clarify the exact role 
of both approaches.  
 
Considering the typical length of complex procurement projects, for instance PFI 
projects with project life-cycles of up to 50 years, various benefits and problems are 
associated with the application of long-term contracts as opposed to short-term contracts 
(Cohen and Agrawal, 1999). For example, long-term relationships enable the 
development of trust, while at the same time it is unavoidable that conflicts will arise in 
many long-term relationships (Deakin et al., 1997). Formal control may play an 
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elevated role in managing long-term supply arrangements; especially when considering 
changing personnel, stakeholders and regulations/policies. Contracts as part of formal 
control may be used as a planning and incentivisation tool with the provision of legal 
enforceability in long-term business relationships (Deakin et al., 1997). Furthermore, 
the importance of formal control in long-term relationships may also be related to 
relationship termination and conflict resolution issues. Relationship dissolution is 
particularly challenging in the absence of legally-binding contracts and when the 
relationship is of an exclusive, long-term nature, involving substantial investments by 
suppliers (Harrison, 2004).  
 
With specific reference to complex public-private supply arrangements, it has been 
argued that the sheer multiplicity of stakeholders, with the various and often conflicting 
interests and strategies (Klijn and Teisman, 2003), necessitates the active consideration 
of relationships as co-ordinating mechanisms for intra- and inter-organisational 
networks (Tranfield et al., 2005, Koppenjan, 2005). Conversely, research has 
highlighted the additional difficulties that public-private relationships might face 
(Lonsdale, 2005, Erridge, 2002). For instance, Teisman and Klijn (2004) argue that 
commercial contract negotiations between the private and public sector may be 
influenced by their different values and strategies. They state that public actors are 
driven by politics and an emphasis on formal transparency in delivering public value; 
whereas private actors are driven by financial value creation. These difficulties are also 
partly reflected in an imbalance of power between the actors (Grimshaw et al., 2002) – 
although different authors have interpreted this in different ways; some arguing that the 
public sector has a sub-ordinate role in the relationship, whilst others present such 
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relationships as problematic for a buyer organisation due to post-contractual lock-in to 
suppliers (Lonsdale, 2005). That is, in relationships where asset specificity and 
switching costs are significantly high, buyers face problems with exiting the 
relationship and become dependent on suppliers. Furthermore, the extent of political 
influence on PFI procurement decisions may impact on the nature of public-private 
supply relationships (Lonsdale, 2005).  
 
Combining the capital goods project co-ordination perspective of the CoPS literature 
with insights from formal and informal governance mechanisms suggests there is still a 
problem space to address. In spite of some prescription, there is a variety of divergent 
opinion that validates the central research question of the paper; how should complex 
performance be procured in the design and construction phase of major construction 
projects?  
 
Research methodology  
Although, inevitably, the projects differ in some key aspects they were both selected as 
challenging complex procurement projects. The hospital was contract was pioneering in 
being among the ‘first wave’ of PFI healthcare projects in the UK, while the Heathrow 
Terminal 5 project is one of Europe’s largest projects, T5 on its own being equivalent to 
Europe’s fifth largest airport (Davies, Brady and Gann, 2007:10). 
Given the relatively limited extant literature explaining how complex performance can 
be procured, exploratory empirical case studies were used. Case studies are particularly 
useful when exploring new areas of research (Eisenhardt, 1989). Equally, the rich 
qualitative and quantitative data sets generated (Yin, 1994) are particularly important 
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for the measurement of complex and intangible phenomena and the need to look beyond 
organizational boundaries. Therefore, the adaptation of a contextualised view 
(Pettigrew, 1985) was a central premise of this research. The empirical element of the 
paper stems from two discrete case studies of complex procurement environments; both 
of which provide a wealth of published and unpublished secondary material. The first 
case study is a design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) PFI hospital project and the 
second case study the newly built Terminal 5 (T5) at Heathrow airport in London. Table 
2 summarises the key characteristics of the cases, some data has been disguised for 
reasons of confidentiality. Also the table highlights the difference in scale between the 
two projects, being larger, T5 had more scope for bespoke performance. 
 
[Please insert: Table 2: Overview of key case characteristics, about here] 
 
In the PFI case twenty semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with different key 
stakeholders (lasting between one to two hours) were conducted over a period of two 
years. This total includes interviews with public sector organisations such as the NHS 
Trust (effectively the ‘buyer’) and the Private Finance Unit (PFU), a public sector 
consultancy organisation, and with private sector organisations, for instance, the 
construction company and banks. The case study of T5 took place over 20 months from 
June 2005 to January 2007. 30 interviews were conducted with most of the senior 
managers on the project, including past and present project directors and senior project 
managers from BAA (the client), Laing O’Rourke (LOR) the major constructor on the 
project and the former project director of British Airways (BAA’s customer), and some 
project team members. The research acknowledged the complex network associated 
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with both case studies and thus data collection moved beyond the dyadic relationship of 
client and prime contractor. The breadth of interviewees was necessary to capture a 
variety of perspectives and build rich insights relating to the bidding/contract 
negotiation and construction phases of the two projects. All interviews were digitally 
recorded and transcribed, whilst the confidentiality of participating organisations and 
individuals was assured. One feature of complex infrastructural projects is that they tend 
to be high profile and therefore produce a variety of reports some pure public relations, 
and others, much more informative for research purposes, aimed at institutional 
stakeholders such as financial analysts and public audit authorities.  Hence, interview 
data was further strengthened through triangulation using secondary data including 
company documentation and reports from HM Treasury and the Audit Commission on 
Private Finance Initiative (e.g. The Stationery Office, 2000; HM Treasury, 2006). 
NVivo7 was used to support analysis of the interview transcripts and secondary data 
sources. Specific coding included contextual variables and items attached to the use of 
formal and informal control mechanisms. Coding items included dimensions such as 
reliability, credibility, fairness, goodwill and competence across individuals. In 
addition, to facilitate the interpretation of commonalities and differences between cases, 
data matrices were used (Miles and Huberman, 1994) to analyse changes in key 
contextual variables in relation to changing patterns of governance mechanisms. 
 
Case findings 
This section presents a description of the two cases including a brief summary of the 
case backgrounds.  
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PFI hospital  
Background of PFI hospital 
Limited existing healthcare capacity and increasing demand on the town centre hospital, 
which had been built in the late 1950s, resulted in the decision to replace the old 
hospital and centralise a number of other health facilities into one large, new, hospital 
on a ‘greenfield’ site outside the town. The 500 plus bed acute district general hospital 
was designed, built, financed, and operated (DBFO) by a private sector contractor under 
the PFI scheme. The principal public–private relationship between a single National 
Health Service (NHS) Trust and a private partner, a company that combines both a 
building and a facility management (FM) division, is covered under the concession 
agreement (see Figure 2). The concession agreement represents a legally-binding 
contract covering the rights and obligations during the construction and operation 
phases over a 30-year relationship life-cycle. Since signing the contract in the late 
1990s, the contract has been modified to accommodate changes in the stakeholder 
equity structure. In 2003 the concession agreement was adjusted to incorporate 
additional capacity in the form of a multi-bed Diagnostic Treatment Centre at an 
additional cost of almost £30million.  
 
[Please insert Figure 2: PFI hospital project structure, about here] 
 
Heathrow Airport London Terminal 5 
Background of Terminal 5 at London’s Heathrow Airport 
T5 will be the new operational base for British Airways (BA) at Heathrow.  BAA built 
the fifth terminal to increase Heathrow’s capacity by 28 million passengers a year. The 
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vision for the project was ambitious – not just completion on time and within budget, 
but to ‘create a new standard for project delivery in the UK’ - a requirement on the 
process.  In addition, key principles were  ‘fair reward for achievements of our 
partners’ (the contractors) and ‘no surprises for BAA shareholders’.   
The basis of the contract between BAA, their main client (BA) and their 60 main 
suppliers is the ‘Team Handbook.’  The contracts are reimbursable, with open-book 
accounting and sampling audit.  The contracts are also incentivised, with payments for 
saving made based on a share of a reward fund – a pooled fund of the benefits gained, 
which will be distributed on the achievement of key milestones in the construction 
phase, and on the achievement of key objectives during the operational phase. Central to 
project delivery and performance in T5 was the BBA policy that ‘The client always 
bears the risk’.  BAA’s operated T5 from the perspective that the client should always 
bear and pay for the risk on the project. This involves identifying possible sources of 
risk and to bring together the best capabilities and resources to manage the risk. 
 
[Please insert Figure 3: Heathrow Terminal 5 project structure, about here] –  
 
 
Beyond the challenges of the main terminal buildings and new air traffic control tower 
the project involved new roads, hotel facilities, the diversion of two rivers, over 13km 
of bored tunnel and more (see Shanghavi et al 2008 for more detailed statistics). T5 also 
holds the record for the longest public inquiry in UKK planning history, over 40 months 
(see table 2).  
 
 16 
Both the construction of T5 and a PFI hospital involve therefore substantial and 
sophisticated procurement, this section concludes with a summary table (Table 3) that 
identifies core comparisons between the two forms of complex performance so that the 
analysis section can be focused on key issues. Therefore not all the issues reported in 
table 3 can be pursed here (see Davies, Gann and Douglas 2007 fro a full account of 
T5), the focus is only on those that inform our understanding of procuring complex 
performance.  
 
[Please insert: Table 3 Summary project features, about here] 
 
 
Discussion  
Drawing on the literature review this discussion section is structured into three parts; 
complex product systems, formal, and then informal, control mechanisms.  
 
Complex product systems and procuring complex performance 
In Hobday’s  (1998) comprehensive comparison of CoPS and mass production as 
idealized types, T5 and the early PFI hospital match well with CoPS product 
characteristics (e.g. complex component interfaces; high unit cost; product cycles last 
decades; many skills/knowledge inputs; (many) tailored components and upstream, 
capital goods). Similarly under the comparison heading of production characteristics 
both entities are project/small batch arrangements.  However marked differences 
emerge under Hobday’s last four headings; innovation processes; competitive strategies 
and innovation co-ordination; Industrial coordination and evolution and market 
characteristics. The differences suggest that many of the features of procurement in the 
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hospital case resonate more with traditional mass production commodity or product 
based management and procurement.  
Under innovation Hobday suggests innovation processes are user/producer driven 
suggesting co-creation of knowledge (Vargo and Lusch, 2004)  and innovation paths 
agreed ex-ante among suppliers, users etc.  T5 provided examples of co-created 
solutions such as the extension and within project underground excavation and 
tunnelling required (Shanghavi et al., 2008). Authors have generally been highly critical 
of innovations arising from early PFIs (Barlow and Koeberle-Gaiser, 2008 & 2009). In 
the T5 case innovation was both co-created with suppliers, part of the ‘no blame’ 
culture of the project, however in the early PFI example innovation was the 
responsibility of the contractor, and the contractor’s interpretation of the requirement. In 
the hospital case, an interpretation often made more complicated by the much greater 
detail of upfront specifications. 
 
Under competitive strategies and innovation co-ordination Hobday presents key features 
of CoPS as being a focus on product design & development rather than a focus on 
economies of scale/cost; the management of multi-firm alliances in temporary projects 
and most critically of all here; system integration competencies. The biggest contrast 
between the two cases and their approach to procuring complex performance flows from 
their contrasting approaches to managing co-ordination. BAA as stated set out to have a 
few but close relationships, having meticulously pre-selected key supply partners (Table 
3). By dividing the business into four keys areas (see Figure 3) the size of the project 
was kept manageable and risk, and supplier performance (and capability for innovative 
working) could be exposed. In contrast the PFI hospital had an arms length relationship 
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with sub suppliers managing only the relationship with the key contractor. In the 
hospital case procurement did not include a systems integration role – this was 
delegated to the contractor. This emphasis on the co-ordination mechanism (noted in the 
literature review above) in CoPS is also reflected in Hobdays treatment of industrial 
coordination and evolution, where the comparison is on the ‘elaborate network’ of 
CoPS with the large firm/supply chain focus of mass production. Whilst the PFI case 
exhibits an elaborate network of stakeholders, the approach to procurement resonates 
more with that of a focal firm operating in a standardized product, uni-flow supply 
chain. Although the pyramid presentation in Figure 3 is not ideal for stressing the 
network nature of T5, Figure 3 does demonstrate the breadth of engagement with the T5 
supply base.  
 
Having started with features from Hobday that suggested both the construction and the 
hospital fit well with definitions of CoPS, his final category market characteristics 
returns to highlighting similarities across the cases with CoPS. Both cases feature few 
buyers and few sellers, a small number of large transactions, business to business (not 
consumer) markets and the absence of market prices. In terms of expanding our 
understanding of procuring complex performance this absence of market prices appears 
an important element of the difference between traditional and complex performance 
procurement.  
 
This section, whilst highlighting enough similarities between CoPS and the two cases to 
confirm that both are CoPS, has highlighted key areas in which the procurement of 
performance in the PFI case drew on an earlier mass production procurement notably in 
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contracting for complex performance through a traditional dyadic interface with one 
contractor in contrast to the more networked approach in T5.  
 
Formal control and procuring complex performance 
The literature review highlighted that formal control can be applied through a tightly 
specified contract, where such a ‘complete’ contract can be written. However in both 
cases, and perhaps more generally in complex construction (Akintoye et al., 2000), non-
contractually specified collaboration will be required; and pragmatically is anticipated 
by both parties whatever the completeness level of the written contract. In terms of 
formal control the strongest contrast between the two cases is how the projects used the 
substantial ‘start-up’ phase. In the PFI interviews problems with the sheer size and 
complexity of the (first wave and therefore non-standard) PFI contract were commonly 
reported; driven initially by an ambiguous and prolonged drafting process abetted by a 
time-consuming contract variations process. Despite its legal formality, different 
stakeholders interpreted the PFI contract documents very differently: for instance 
several NHS Trust interviewees perceived the contractor as being mainly interested in 
‘building rather than delivering the service’, highlighting how they specified cheap lift 
products with high maintenance costs. Conversely, the contractor argued that the 
specification problems had been caused, partly by the ‘early project’ status where 
pivotal contract information was sparse or missing (e.g. for a meaningful risk transfer to 
be assured, market tested life-cycle costs for a whole range of products – including lifts 
- were needed). These ‘first wave’ problems eventually led to the creation of the PFU 
unit (table 3).  
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In contrast to the time spent in the start up phase on formal, contractual mechanisms in 
the PFI, the early work in the T5 approach was much more informal, both in the lack of 
emphasis on the contract and in the strong emphasis on behavioural standards. This 
relative informality is perhaps only made possible by BAAs assumption that they will 
always own risk (Table 3). It is surely deliberate that the T5 equivalent to the PFI 
concession document was called an Agreement implying collaboration rather than 
hierarchy. Setting an objective as ‘no surprises for shareholders’ illustrates the clarity 
inherent in the BAA approach – albeit also the huge risks that were underwritten.  
 
This analysis of the cases appears to support Teisman and Klijn (2004)’s view that the 
public and private sectors may be influenced by their different values and strategies. In 
the PFI case formal control is a part of the philosophy of UK public procurement, 
driven, these authors suggest, by politics and an emphasis on formal transparency in 
delivering public value whereas private actors are driven by financial value creation. 
Thus in the public sector PFI case the start up phase appears to focus on clarification of 
what the contract will cover (the what? question – the transparency of objective/what 
will be done and the shape of the financial envelope of the project) but at the expense of 
transparency of practice or the how? question. A number of NHS Trusts interviewees 
perceived the formal PFI contract to be almost exclusively about the legal and financial 
aspects of the deal. For instance, although the Hospital Company was responsible for 
the ‘entirety’ of the PFI contract, several interviewees argued that the Hospital 
Company was mostly focused on the financing (and re-financing) aspects of the 
governance process. In contrast the T5, private sector (financial value creation) 
approach in this case, is to spend less upfront time on the what question (as in the PFI 
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case, there is a face answer – build a new terminal or a hospital) and concentrate upfront 
time instead on the how – especially in the form of supplier selection and relationship 
management.  
 
Before translating this analysis into implications, there are some counter balancing 
factors to consider. BAA was better placed in the T5 project to leverage learning and 
capabilities from other projects, drawing significantly both on an internal project 
methodology and prior experience with project applied information systems (table 3). It 
would appear financial rather than project issues dominated the pre construction phases 
of PFI as well as significant co-ordination issues. It appears BAA internalized much of 
what PFI leaves to the market/client/contractor interface to solve (table 3). Although 
again the caveat is necessary that the PFI has a much longer horizon and it is almost 
impossible at this stage to assess success in achieving some goals. Even allowing for 
BAA’s greater expertise (they were regular buyers of airport facilities), the implications 
from comparing these two cases are that in procuring complex performance in 
construction, the use of start-up  phase is one key variable, and that project success 
appears more likely if this project start up time is devoted to working on the how of 
delivery complex performance than the what.  
The differing interests/capabilities of the public private sectors have been discussed as 
constraints and enablers.  It was suggested that in complex construction projects the 
start up phase needs to address how issues such as selecting innovative suppliers and 
relationship management and communicating how the project will work. 
 
Informal control and procuring complex performance 
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Much of the content of Table 3 contrasts the use of less formal control mechanisms 
(although certainly control mechanisms are there) in the T5 project. The influence of 
behavioural and even reputational factors is high (table 3). Certainly in the period 
covered here the T5 project can be characterised as making greater use of trust than the 
PFI project. However the cases do not appear to address a simple bifurcation between 
either trust or a complex ‘complete’ contract.  As the literature suggested, long term 
relationships such as PFI ones are often a context for trust to be used as a governance 
mechanism (Cohen and Agrawal, 1999). But what we see in the PFI case is two key 
variables that relate to the maturity of the project that restrict the development of for 
example a trust based approach: the maturity of the market for PFI, and internal 
employee turnover on the PFI side. 
  
Under formal control the work undertaken in the start up phase was linked to the 
fragmented and perhaps over detailed approach of the PFI project in the start up phase. 
Now the initial, early stage conduct of this public sector project is linked to constraining 
the extent to which collaborative working and the build up of goodwill and trust for 
future collaborative working was possible. BAA’s T5 approach had been to carefully 
select senior managers and keep them in place for the initial phases, and specifically the 
contract negotiation team. A constant complaint from all parties about the PFI project 
was the constant turnover of staff, and particularly the project manager role itself. 
Critically here BAA kept the same contract negotiation team in place for the length of 
the bidding phase. For the health service ‘buyer’ there was a real lack of internal 
experience of PFI, and an inability it seemed to pay market rates for good staff. 
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Therefore as the PFI market matured any NHS staff with sound experience of PFI found 
they were in demand and at salaries not available in the local NHS.  
This issue of a shortage of skills in an immature market or industry also affected the 
ability of the NHS buyer to use trust and informal mechanisms when it had so little 
experience of the likely outcomes for PFI. Whereas in T5 whilst the major contractor 
had not built such a large project before it had extensive relevant experience from other 
projects, and industries such as oil and gas.  
Rather than support a distinction between either the use of contracts or softer, 
behavioural mechanism this analysis draws attention to the influence of context and 
relationship development as important variables in line with Klein Woolthuis et al. 
(2005). Particularly the cases may be examples where the context of the market is 
asymmetric for buyer and supplier (e.g. in their varying capacities here to cope with an 
immature market) and that this externally driven asymmetry in at least the early stages 
overrides the contract versus trust debate.  
 
Conclusions   
The paper has added a procurement perspective to the influential CoPS perspective to 
examine actual procurement practices in two complex performance procurements in 
major construction projects. It has also identified actual practices to support and inform 
the meta level analysis of the Procurement Complexity Space proposed by Lewis and 
Roehrich, (2009). 
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It has been suggested that the two examples of contracting for complex performance 
take substantially different approaches. The PFI case is more traditional in trying to 
offload to risk via a detailed contractual mechanism, and in adopting manufacturing 
style procurement practices. In contrast T5 sought to identify and expose risk, and then 
to incentivise those parties best qualified to manage the risk to take innovative 
approaches, comfortable with the knowledge that their work load and margin would be 
acknowledged and protected. Other differences relate to the extent that previous 
learning and capabilities could be brought to the project, although the advantage 
provided by the scale of T5, e.g. in designing an information system has to be 
acknowledged. Although this paper has only examined a limited number of areas, one 
key area of difference is the client/contractor interface. Here BAA sought to control 
internally much of the early decision making in comparison to the contractor led 
approach taken in PFI. The BAA approach was far better suited to engaging the talents 
of the supply base, whereas in PFI such contributions are directly mediated by the prime 
contractor.  It should also be stressed that BAA will have no relationship in the 
operating phase of T5, whereas in PFI the main contractor is still involved, albeit via a 
facilities management division. 
 
The paper has explored the practices of complex procurement to address the question 
how should complex performance be procured in the design and construction phase of 
major construction projects? The cases analysis suggests traditional mass production 
commodity or product based management and procurement are not appropriate, 
evidenced in a lack of innovation in the PFI case. Procuring complex performance from 
these cases needs to involve suppliers and some levels of value co-creation, often ex 
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ante. A lack of market prices was identified as sign of procuring complex performance 
(PCP). In these construction cases the start up phase appears critical, the more 
successful case spent start up time on how the project could work (including 
communication, supplier selection and relationship management) not on formal 
specifications. This is suggested as a feature of PCP and linked to the differing motives 
of public and private clients, that is transparency versus value creation. Finally the 
influence of market maturity on the possible levels of trust was identified, suggesting a 
key factor of successful PCP is understanding and working with the dynamic of the 
market, for example not attempting to move faster than the market will allow, e.g.  in 
terms of recruitment and retention or even risk taking.  
 
It is important to reflect upon the work’s limitations and further research opportunities. 
The research work presented here is highly context-bound, further conceptual and 
empirical work is needed to investigate the relationships between context, process and 
outcome of using different governance mechanisms (Pettigrew, 1985). There is a need 
to understand how unique the PFI/PPP and T5 contracting mechanisms really are, such 
large undertakings have in fact been constructed since before written records. 
Apparently new techniques and approaches may mask deeper continuities. 
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